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Abstract: - We propose a secure full-duplex VoIP and instant messaging system on a Pocket PC platform, 
allowing for session key transport using a public-key protocol and encrypted text or voice communication using 
a private-key algorithm. The full-duplex VoIP scheme presents good performance for long duration 
communication over LAN networks.  
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1   Introduction 
Voice over Internet Protocol [2] (also called VoIP, 
IP Telephony, Internet telephony, and Digital Phone) 
is the routing of voice conversations over the Internet 
or any other IP-based network. The voice data flows 
over a general-purpose packet-switched network, 
instead of traditional dedicated, circuit-switched 
voice transmission lines. VoIP is a technology that 
has the potential to completely rework the world's 
phone systems. Secure [3] VoIP includes a Session 
Initiation Protocol [1] with session key transport.  
While secure VoIP providers like Skype [9] have 
already been around for some time and are growing 
steadily, there are few implementations available for 
Pocket PC [8]. The Pocket PC platform has very 
limited storage and computational resources so a 
VoIP scheme, which is always very demanding, can 
be difficult to implement with such limitations. If we 
consider encryption of all communications, the 
computational cost can even be higher than what a 
Pocket PC can perform. This is the reason for this 
paper: explain the experiences, difficulties and 
results regarding the implementation of this kind of 
applications on the Pocket PC platform.  
All cryptographic algorithms [5] used are 
recognized standards in their respective areas [10]. 
We have chosen RSA as the asymmetric 
cryptosystem and AES as the symmetric 
cryptosystem. RSA is already implemented in the 
Pocket PC cryptographic API, but AES is not 
available yet, requiring additional libraries [7] that 
were adapted to the high performance requirements 
of a VoIP system. 
We have chosen C# as the language for the 
implementation since we consider that the .NET 
platform has a great future and it is a good 
opportunity to test the performance even in the non 
favourable case of a virtual machine based language 
such as C#. On the other hand, all critical 
components of the protocol (e.g. AES, RSA) have 
been implemented as highly efficient native code 
libraries.  
The application consists of three parts: session 
key transport based on public-key encryption, simple 
text message exchange and full-duplex VoIP system. 
The session key transport must be easy to use, fast 
and secure in its domain. The simple text message 
exchange must also be fast and easy to use. The 
VoIP system must assure that the computational cost 
required for encryption and decryption is not too 
high for the intended platform. Voice treatment is 
not part of this paper [4], but the VoIP protocol must 
be tolerant to connection losses in the network and 
resynchronizations of the two voice threads, since 
this kind of errors can occur often in the mobile 
domain of the pocket PC platform. 
 
 
2   Preliminaries 
We use the following notation in this paper: 
 
Y1 | Y2 denotes the concatenation of Y1 and Y2.  
k1, k2, … kn are private keys. 
KUx is the public key of X. 
KPx is the private key of X. 
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N1,N2…Nn are cryptographically valid random 
numbers. 
Ek(Y) denotes encryption (e.g. AES) of data Y 
using k key. 
Dk(Y) denotes decryption (e.g. AES) of data Y 
using k key. 
PX(Y ) denotes public-key encryption (e.g. RSA) 
of data Y using party X’s public key. It is the 
same as EKUx(Y). 
PDX(Y) denotes public-key decryption (e.g. 
RSA) of data Y using party X’s public key. It is 
the same as DKPx(Y). 
SX(Y) denotes the result of applying X’s 
signature to the hash or data Y. It is the same as 
EKPx(Y). 
USX(Y) denotes the result of retrieving signature 
Y from the original hash or data. It is the same 
as EKUx(Y). 
 
 
3   Design 
In this section we include a basic explanation of the 
protocols used in the application. 
 
 
3.1 Session Key Transport 
A well known protocol for session key transport is 
the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [6]. 
With this protocol, entity authentication, key 
authentication, and key transport are guaranteed with 
3 messages.  
Let us assume that A and B possess each other’s 
authentic public-key (If this is not the case, but each 
party has a certificate carrying its own public key, 
then one additional message is required for 
certificate transport). Then the Needham-Schroeder 
public-key protocol (Prot.1) (see Fig.1) is as follows: 
(Step 1.1) A → B: PB(N1;A) 
(Step 1.2) A ← B: PA(N1| N2) 
(Step 1.3) A → B: PB(N2) 
 
The protocol actions: 
a) A sends B  message (Step 1.1). 
b) B recovers N1 upon receiving the message 
(Step 1), and returns the message (Step 1.2) to 
A. 
c) Upon decrypting the message (Step 1.2), A 
checks that the key recovered (N1) is the 
same as the one sent in message (Step 1.1). 
(Provided N1 has not been used previously, 
this gives A both entity authentication of B 
and assurance that B knows this key.) A sends 
B message (Step 1.3).  
d) Upon decrypting message (Step 1.3), B 
checks the key N2 recovered agrees with that 
sent in message (Step 1.2). The session key 
may be computed as f(N1; N2) using an 
appropriate publicly known non-reversible 
function f. 
 
3.2 Voice Transmission 
Let us consider two machines, A is the voice origin 
and B is the voice destination. When A sends voice 
data to B, the transmission is not instantaneous and a 
delay occurs. B stores the data received in a local 
buffer, so when a number of data k is stored, B starts 
to reproduce the stored information. This buffer is 
necessary, because the time needed to send the data 
is not known exactly. We define recover the buffer 
as the process of refilling the buffer with voice data. 
The Sample Time is Tm, Tr is the transmission 
delay (lapse between recording at origin and 
reproduction at destination) and Tp is the processing 
time defined in equation (1). 
PDA A PDA B
(1) PB(N1;A) 
(2) PA(N1| N2) 
(3) PB(N2) 
B Knows:
KUb:  its public key.
KPb:  its private key.
KUa:  A’s public key.
F(y1,y2): publicly known 
non-reversible function 
B has to compute:
N2 a cryptographically 
valid random number. 
F(N1,N2) The session key.
A Knows:
KUa:  its public key.
KPa:  its private key.
KUb:  B’s public key.
F(y1,y2): publicly known 
non-reversible function 
A has to compute:
N1 a cryptographically 
valid random number. 
F(N1,N2) The session key.
 
Fig. 1 Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol 
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 Tp = TCrypt + TSend + TDecrypt  (1) 
 
The time required to encrypt the recorded data 
(measured in Tm units of time) is denoted by TCrypt. 
This time is established by A, although it can 
theoretically be considered constant. TDecrypt is the 
time used to decrypt the data received at the 
destination and can also be considered constant. 
TSend is the time employed to send the data from 
the origin to the destination. The network establishes 
this time and, therefore, can’t be calculated at the 
origin, but it can, nevertheless, be estimated. 
The relation between times is defined in 
equations (2) and (3). 
 
 Tp < Tm  (2) 
 Tr = k · Tm + Tp  (3) 
 
The parameter k is the size of the buffer. 
Equation (3) is always true, while equation (2), in 
some cases, can be false. When this occurs, the data 
stored in the buffer is used, guaranteeing the 
continuity of reproduction. If this occurs k times it is 
called buffer overflow and, if the buffer isn’t 
recovered, a silence of duration Tp - Tm time units 
will be listened at the destination or, if the buffer is 
recovered, the silence will be of Tr time units. If the 
buffer isn’t recovered, the next time (2) is false 
another buffer overflow will occur. If the buffer is 
recovered then it is necessary that (2) is false another 
k times for a new buffer overflow to occur. 
Two kinds of algorithms for voice transmission 
are developed for this article. The first one (Twisted 
client-server approach) considers each machine as a 
voice server that records and sends to the clients that 
are connected. For this approach it is necessary that 
each machine works as a voice server and voice 
client simultaneously. This is necessary in order to 
obtain a real full-duplex communication, but it is 
computationally expensive. It also requires a 
mechanism to synchronise both threads of 
communication.  
The second one (client-server approach) 
establishes a communication between both machines.  
Each time a voice packet is sent, the other machine 
replies with the voice packet corresponding to the 
same time. Therefore, the synchronization 
mechanism is embedded into the algorithm. Also, it 
is less expensive computationally. 
 
 
4   Implementation 
We improve the memory management of the player 
and recorder classes included in the public library 
OpenNETCF [7]. The main functions analysed in 
this application follow next. 
 
4.1 Session Key Transport 
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol 
implementation (Prot.2): 
 
(Step 2.1) A → B: PB(N1|IDA|Alg|sizeKey) 
(Step 2.2) A ← B: PA(N1| N2)  
(Step 2.3) A → B: PB(N2)  
 
The algorithm defined in this design is used for 
the implementation of the session key transport. 
Fixed sizes for the Keys, secrets and other variables 
involved in the algorithm are needed for the 
implementation. The sizes used are as follows: 
• Secrets N1 and N2 are of 16 bytes of length 
(128 bits) each one. 
  
T m  
Voice origin 
    
Voice destination
  
  
  
T p  
T r   
 
Fig. 2 Voice transmission diagram 
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• ID (13 bytes) identifies each machine.  
• Alg (1 byte) identifies the algorithm used for 
encryption. 
• sizeKey (2 bytes) is the size of the key used 
in Alg. 
 
RSA is the public key system used for 
encryption and decryption. Since all packets sent in 
the session key transport, are not bigger than 32 
bytes, no fragmentation is needed. This restriction 
defines the size of the rest of the variables.  
Secrets N1 and N2 are the random numbers used 
to create the session key and 16 bytes for each one is 
the biggest size possible to avoid RSA packet 
fragmentation. 
Alg and sizeKey are set to the minimum size 
required and the rest of bytes are for ID. With this 
distribution we have 2104 possible machines, 28 
possible encryption algorithms and a maximum 
possible key size of 216 bits.  
The session key is computed as f(N1; N2). Where 
f(N1; N2) is the function that concatenates N1 and N2 
and gets bytes from N1.length – (Key.length/2) to 
N1.length + (Key.length/2)    
 
4.1.1 Client side algorithm 
a) A encrypts, with B’s public key, message 
(Step 2.1), and sends it to B. 
b) A receives message (Step 2.2) and decrypts it 
with its private key.  
c) Upon decrypting message (Step 2.2), A 
checks that the key N1 recovered agrees with that 
sent in message (Step 2.1). (Provided N1 has 
never been used previously, this gives A both 
entity authentication of B and assurance that B 
knows this key.)  
d) A sends B message (Step 2.3).  
e) The session key is computed as f(N1; N2).  
 
4.1.2 Server side algorithm 
a) B receives message (Step 2.1) and decrypts it 
with its private key. 
b) B recovers N1 upon receiving message (Step 
1), and returns message (Step 2.2) to A. 
c) B receives message (Step 2.3).   
d) Upon decrypting message (Step 2.3), B 
checks that the key N2 recovered agrees with that 
sent in message (Step 2.2).  
e) The session key may be computed as f(N1;N2)  
 
4.2 Text Transmission 
In this application, text transmission consists of 
encrypting text with the session key and sending it to 
the destination machine. 
Each machine is always a text message server, 
waiting to receive a text message from a client. At 
the same time, each machine is a client that can send 
text to another machine if they have interchanged a 
session key. 
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Fig. 3 Time variations in size increments 
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4.3 Voice Transmission 
In this application, voice transmission consists in 
sending voice data encrypted with the session key 
and receiving voice data from another machine and 
decrypting it. Voice is recorded and stored using the 
standard WAV format which has a header that 
permits storing information about sound format (bits, 
channels, frequency). In this version, sound format is 
constant, but a good enhancement could be 
implementing dynamic sound format.  
When voice connection between two machines 
is activated, the client machine sends a 
synchronization byte. After this byte is received, at 
the same time, the two machines start a record 
process that records voice blocks of 576 bytes (set by 
experimentation). These blocks are stored in the send 
buffer, which is cyclical and has 4 elements (set by 
experimentation). This limitation prevents that slow 
networks will not increase the delay between voice 
recording and playback (tr). If a network is too slow 
for sending the voice blocks fast enough, then a jump 
in reproduction is heard in the target machine. This is 
caused by the cyclical buffer. Another process sends 
the voice blocks to the destination machine. To do 
this, there are two approaches. 
 
4.3.1 Twisted client-server approach 
In this approach, each machine is a voice server that 
receives voice data from the clients that are 
connected and plays back the sound. For this 
approach it is necessary that each machine works as 
a server and client simultaneously. This is similar to 
text transmission, only that more bandwidth is 
required. This is the reason why this approach 
obtains catastrophic results on Pocket PC systems 
with WiFi communication. A great number of 
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Fig. 4 Buffer state 
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Fig. 5 Lost packets                                                                     Fig. 6 Lost packets 
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collisions occur and a big delay is produced in the 
communications. Half-duplex communication works 
fine with this approach, but full-duplex 
communication is not possible.  
 
4.3.2 Client-server approach 
The second approach establishes a 
communication between the two machines. Only 
one acts as a server and the other is the client. In 
this communication each time a machine sends a 
voice packet, the other machine replies with the 
corresponding packet to the same time. 
Therefore, the synchronization mechanism is 
embedded into the algorithm. Finally, there is a 
process that plays back voice blocks. This process 
gets data from the received buffer and plays it.  
The voice blocks size and send buffer length are 
parameters set by experimentation.  
 
 Tp = TCrypt + TSend + TDecrypt  (4) 
 Tm = T(wav, nwav) (5) 
 Tp < T(wav,nwav)  (6) 
 nwav = 11025 · Tm in bytes  (7) 
 Tr = k · Tm + Tp  (8) 
 nwav = nsend – 48 in bytes (9) 
 Tsm = Tm – (TCrypt + TDecrypt) (10) 
 Tse < Tsm (11) 
 
We have a function T(wav, n) that returns the 
duration time of the WAV data. This time is always 
equal to Tm  (Sample Time). As we see in the design, 
Tp has to be less than T(wav,n) in the average case 
(6). Tp and T(wav,n) are related by the parameter n, 
and n is related to Tm and the WAV format. If Tm 
increases then n increases as well, and if we choose a 
better WAV format then n increases too. We choose 
the WAV format to be 8 bits, mono and 11 kHz; this 
is a small format and has phone quality. With this 
format we have the relation (7) between Tm and n. 
Finally we want Tr to be as small as possible, and k 
to be as big as possible.  We can take Tm smaller, but 
we have to consider the restriction of Tp, that must 
include the encryption, transmission and decryption 
of the n bytes in less time that Tm. 
After this, nsend is set to 576 bytes so, Tm is 52 
milliseconds. This is set by experimentation (see 
Fig.3). Tse is the estimated send time and Tsm is the 
maximum send time. The relation (11) is true with a 
nsend higher than 562 and nsend is set to 576 that 
provides Tm a bit bigger than a 1/20 of second with 
good performance results.  
Finally, k is chosen to be four, so Tr is less than 
260 milliseconds. With this value we have a buffer a 
bit bigger than 1/5 of second. This value of k 
produces good performance in our case of study (see 
Fig.4). So, Tr is less than a ¼ of second, and that is a 
good enough value.  
With this values and a good WiFi connection 
between machines, minimum loss of packets was 
detected in a communication with duration longer 
than 24 hours (see Fig.5 and Fig.6). No loss of audio 
performance was detected either. 
 
 
5   Conclusion 
Observing the results, we can conclude that Pocket 
PC platform is good enough to implement the 
hardest part of a secure VoIP and instant messaging 
system. This application allows session key transport 
using a public-key protocol and encrypted text or 
voice communication using a private-key algorithm. 
The full-duplex VoIP scheme has good performance 
for communications with duration longer than 24 
hours and no degradation of the system was detected. 
The application can be extended to more than 
two machines [8] using Windows CE certificates for 
the session key transport. A more complex system 
for voice treatment could also be advisable. But all 
enhancements are only add-ons that do not change 
the computational requirements shown in this paper. 
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